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In 1993 it became apparent that change had to occur throughout the US space transportation industry due
to international competition, obsolescence and reducing federal budgets, NASA mandated a 25% Space Shuttle
Program budget reduction through 1996 and the Congress directed Access To Space study was performed.
Government policy based on the Access To Space study findings, directed development of Reusable Launch
Vehicle technology while supporting Space Shuttle enhancements to combat ageing, obsolescence and opera-
tions costs.
NASA Kennedy Space Center and Lockheed Martin Space Operations responded by increasing Space
Shuttle processing operations efficiency through increased test automation, operations enhancements, tech-
nology infusion and innovations. Management processes and operations infrastructure have been streamlined
through technology infusion and the establishment of a continuous improvement program (CIP). The results
of these efforts to date have enabled NASA to maintain the Shuttle Program flight manifest with lower operat-
ing costs while at the same time decreasing the number of processing problems and in-flight anamolies en-
countered per mission.
The objectives of this paper are: to provide an overview of the enhancements implemented to date and
demonstrate how potential future operations enhancements through technology infusion to ground and ve-
hicle systems can make the Space Shuttle Transportation System cost effective for government applications
and commercially competitive with international ELV’S until a commercially viable RLV program becomes
operational.
Operations Overview
The National Space Transportation System is the
only transportation system that has demonstrated the
capability of launching, retrieval/repair, and return-
ing payloads to and from space with human presence
utilizing a partial reusable launch vehicle. Because
of the wide spectrum of functions performed by the
Space Shuttle vehicle, the NSTS consists of many
operations entities. Only 32 percent of the current to-
tal Shuttle Program budget (Figure 1.) is directly as-
sociated with hardware driven costs, including:
SSME manufacture/ processing, ET manufacture/pro-
cessing, SRM/SRB refurbishment, Orbiter process-
ing, ground support equipment, payload integration,
launch/landing and mission operations. The balance
(68 percent) of the budget is spent on sustaining en-
gineering, management, institution, shuttle produc-
tion capability, technology application development
and upgrades. The KSC processing and logistics
functions represent about 20 percent of the per flight
costs and JSC mission operations functions represent
about 11 percent of the per flight costs. In order to
optimize the cost per pound to orbit, the percentage
of total budget associated with vehicle/mission pro-
cessing must be maximized and the percentage asso-
ciated with overhead minimized.
Processing Space Shuttle flight hardware require
extensive facilities, facility support and ground sup-
port equipment with unique capabilities. The primary
operations occur at the Kennedy Space Center,
Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Center,
Goddard Space Center and Stennis Space Center. Fig-
ure 2 provides an overview of the Space Shuttle ve-
hicle processing flow at the Kennedy Space Center,
Space Shuttle Cost Drivers
The primary Space Shuttle Program overhead
costs are driven by the government manned space pro-
gram inheritance, extreme reliability requirements,
stringent configuration management, performance
driven design and a wide spectrum of mission capa-
bilities.
Infrastructure to support manned/piloted space-
flight require the training, simulation and flight sup-
port items provided by JSC. Additional support is re-
quired at KSC ranging from flight crew accommo-
dations and equipment processing to launch pad
emergency evacuation systems, Vehicle processing
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Overhead
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required to support manned missions including a pres- of these subsystems with their own set of infrastruc-
surized cabin with control systems for pressure, at- ture including fluid sampling, calibration, validation
mospheric composition, unique environmental con- and maintenance.
trol, water and waste management, displays and con- Configuration management and the documenta-
trols with manual select flight control interfaces. Each tion required to support the NSTS is extensive. Docu-
of these subsystems require test, checkout, between mentation is tiered from top level program require-
flight servicing and maintenance. A unique set of ments down to the work authorization documents, each
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with prescribed approval control boards and signature
requirements. All phases of operations, facilities, GSE,
vehicle hardware, ground and vehicle software are se-
verely burdened with documentation, authorization and
tracking.
Multimission capabilities which provide flexibil-
ity in supporting many different types of payloads, ex-
periments, and missions, drive a large infrastructure.
These cost drivers surround mission to mission plan-
ning, flight design and payload integration design. This
leads to a major vehicle processing cost driver due to
payload integration software development, payload in-
tegration hardware kits and the operations associated
with orbiter/payload download/upload, integration test/
checkout and flight crew training. Orbiter/payload
reconfiguration operations are the most serial and con-
straining activities during the OPF portion of the shuttle
processing flow.
Cost drivers associated directly with vehicle and
GSE processing are illustrated in figure 3. Today’s
hardware processing cost drivers can be summarized
as due to inherited design, age and obsolescence.
Inherited desire drivers include the basic configu-
ration which require the manufacture of an ET,
remanufacture, and buildup of the SRB’s and integra-
tion with the orbiter for each mission. The Space Shuttle
is a very complex vehicle with many varied subsystems,
There are over 7,000 individual avionics/electrical
connectors with pin counts ranging from 4 to 128 whose
subsystem functions must be revalidated anytime a con-
nector is demated and remated. Some of the more pro-
cessing intensive areas include the requirement to test,
service and maintain many different complex fluid
systems, several of which involve hazardous and envi-
ronmentally sensitive fluids (multiple hydrazine pro-
pellants, Freon-21, Freon-1 14, FC-40 and ammonia).
The Space Shuttle utilizes other special materials and
components such as pyrotechnic devices for a variety
of purposes and unique tires which must be replaced
each mission. The Shuttle’s thermal protection system
(TPS) is the most processing labor intensive and con-
sists of several types of materials for components rang-
ing from high temperature silica tile and multi-layer
insulation blankets on the orbiter to the ET and SRB’s
foam surface insulation. TPS maintenance include
waterproofing, inflight damage repair and structural
access carrier panel support. The SSME’S operate near
their designed performance limits and currently re-
quire removal after each flight for extensive mainte-
nance and inspections. Each of the above items along
with the others shown in figure 3 require special sup-
port infrastructure including unique trained personnel,
GSE, software and facilities.
Age and obsolescence issues drive GSE and fa-
cility maintenance due to wear and environmental deg-
radation, Vehicle operations costs are driven by out of
date electronic components, increased component fail-
ure rates and extensive orbiter processing down peri-
ods for structural inspections.
A significant reason the factors described above
60131.01D
Figure 3. Space Shuttle Cost Drivers
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Figure 4. STS Problem Report Data Base
are cost drivers is due to the considerable unplanned
vehicle and ground systems maintenance. Greater than
50% of the total processing operations are associated
with unplanned work. An analysis of STS Problem
Reports at KSC between 1989 and 1994 is shown in
Figure 4 and indicates 70910 of all problems are due to
ground systems. Another factor in processing costs is
caused by launch delays, Figure 5 provides summa-
rized data in terms of days delayed and numbers of
delays by category for all STS missions through April,
1995. Orbiter vehicle liquid propulsion systems prob-
lems were responsible for 65% of the accumulated
launch delay time experienced.
Operations Enhancements
The original goals of the NSTS were to process a
vehicle from landing to liftoff in 160 hours, (which is
strikingly similiar to NASA’s goals for a commercial
RLV in year 2005). As the program developed; tech-
nology, performance, safety, costs, schedule and po-
litical limitations were realized; compromises were
made, and the system with its cost drivers evolved.
The early primary program drivers were to accom-
plish mission objectives and reduce vehicle process-
ing turnaround time to enable increased annual flight
rate. The government’s initial attempts at lowering
overhead costs occurred following the STS develop-
ment flight tests (DDTE) phase with the consolida-
tion of processing operations contracts at KSC and
JSC. In 1985, the vehicle processing time at KSC had
a target of 25 days in the OPF, 5 days in the VAB and
13 days at the launch pad. Even though the STS could
not approach the original envisioned 160 hour turn-
around goals, the fundamental design approach of the
system allowed for the capability to significantly re-
duce vehicle and GSE operations costs as compared
to all previous launch systems.
The Challenger accident occurred in January,
1986. The NSTS was reevaluated, mission goals
changed, vehicle checkout philosophy rewritten and
vehicle systems modified to enhance flight crew safety.
All operations and maintenance procedures were re-
written to emphasize safety, requirements and require-
ments tracking. Additional personnel and organizations
were added to the overhead of accomplishing opera-
tions at all levels of the program for Return To Flight.
Shortly after the STS-26R Return To Flight mis-
sion (September 1988), NASA and it’s contractors
began initiating operations enhancement strategies to
reduce vehicle processing turnaround time. In 1992
the focus was redirected toward cost reduction due to
budget pressures (Figure 6).
At KSC, a management commitment in 1991 by
the Lockheed Space Operations Company (now Lock-
heed Martin Space Operations) and NASA to a Con-
tinuous Improvement Process (CIP) was instituted to
support the framework for identifying and implement-
ing enhancements. The process was segmented into
four areas; Operations, Strategic, Facilities/GSE, and
Business. Processing Enhancement Teams were
formed for initiative identification, evaluation and
implementation of specific items. Results of this ef-
fort were immediate and impacted virtually all aspects
of shuttle ground processing. Between 1988 and 1993
Lockheed Martin Space Operations 1-4
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Figure 5. STS Launch Delays - Total Program (April 1981- March 1995)
the KSC shuttle processing work force was reduced
22%, total labor hours per flight was reduced 47%,
while at the same time quality improved as hardware
problem reports were reduced 55% and individual task
performance increased by 44%,
The CIP efforts and positive results have contin-
ued through today as budget pressures and processing
challenges arise. Implementations were accomplished
in many instances by reevaluating previous established
procedures and operations. An example was the Fuel
Cell Runtime Reduction Project where the orbiter post
landing operations procedures were changed to per-
form orbiter ground power transfer and fuel cell shut-
down 14-27 hours earlier than previous established
procedures. Resultant savings are $52,000-$101,000
in fuel cell life cycle cost avoidance per landing and
elimination of a serial processing day from the orbiter
mission flow. Other enhancements associated with this
project include reduced processing safety hazards by
expedited cryogenic reactants (L02/LH2) offload and
FY 1992- FY 1996 Budget to Congress
FY 1997 Budget Recommendation
Figure 6. Space Shuttle Program Budget Projection
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continuous orbiter systems monitor/control until post
flight safing is complete.
Other operations support projects required tech-
nology infusion such as the creation and development
at KSC of the Integrated Work Operations Control
System which is a comprehensive networked process-
ing information system which provides capability for
automated vehicle/GSE scheduling, shop floor work
tracking, paperless work procedure development, com-
puter aided logistics and automated requirements sat-
isfaction tracking. The evolution and implementation
of this system continues today. In addition, the man-
agement of most SSP documents have been converted
from manual/paper systems to electronic network data
bases.
The STS was designed to be automated and has a
GSE/Vehicle combined database of over 50,000 mea-
surement/commands permission. As the STS has ma-
tured, most vehicle system/subsystem powered pro-
cessing operations have been automated to the limits
of the existing Launch Processing System (LPS), GSE,
vehicle systems and ground/flight software capabili-
ties, An example was the consolidation, integration
and automation of all mission to mission hydraulic/
flight control systems testing including; thrust vector
control (orbiter and SRB), aerosurface, brakes, nose
wheel steering, landing gear release and hydraulic
compressibility testing. This effort reduced total se-
rial vehicle integrated flight control/hydraulic testing
from 30 hours to 15 hours per flow. Post test data analy-
sis using strip charts have been eliminated by employ-
ing software algorithms to analyze dynamic sub-
system data real time. Another example is where or-
biter systems powerup and powerdown sequences
were automated which reduced the time for those op-
erations by 70% resulting in cost avoidance of approxi-
mately 80 serial vehicle processing hours per flow.
Technology upgrade supplements have been
added to the Launch Processing System (LPS) such
as the Propulsion Advisory Tool, a multimedia/Rule
Based Reasoning terminal to detect and diagnose main
propulsion system problems including hydrogen leak
isolation; and PC GOAL, a low cost C++/PC based
user friendly data monitoring/display system which
has greatly improved GSE/vehicle fault recognition/
isolation, data analysis and decision making.
The Shuttle Connector Analysis Network was de-
veloped to provide real time tracking of the shuttle’s
7,000 electrical/avionics connectors configuration sta-
tus and individual pin functions retest status. Rule Base
Reasoning software is utilized to implement this sys-
tem which also provides for paperless retest reporting
and is a tool for expediting real time problem trouble-
shooting analysis. A next generation system will be
employed in 1996 to integrate an autonomous electri-
cal connector retest capability.
KSC ground support and facility maintenance
have been improved by incorporating a Reliability
Centered Maintenance and Predictive Maintenance
programs utilizing technology aids involving
ferrography, thermography, vibration analysis, laser
alignment and motor circuit evaluation,
The KSC Shuttle Processing High Priority En-
hancements Steering Committee was established by
NASA/LMSO to oversee and status results of the high-
est priority items.
Vehicle support operations have been improved
by incorporating new ways of managing shop floor
tasks such as the task team leader concept which em-
powers decision making to the lowest and most quali-
fied working level. Simplified Fair Wear and Tear
Specification procedures have been developed for dis-
position of minor vehicle discrepancies. Technology
infusion for vehicle support operations include a tool
to automate Thermal Protection System (TPS) Step
and Gap measurements, GSE Bar Code Tracking and
Still Video Closeout Photo Documentation. Other en-
hancements include the transition of vendor support
tasks from various offsite vendors to the KSC Shuttle
Processing Contractor (LMSO) and the reduction of
vehicle cooling GSE through utilization of an alter-
nate ground cooling technique.
These are only a few examples of the combined
technology and automation enhancements which save
many thousands of engineering and vehicle test op-
erations hours annually at KSC now and into the fu-
ture. During 1995, a bottoms up review was initiated
at KSC which yielded over 2400 additional potential
processing improvements in all areas. The Shuttle Pro-
cessing High Priority Enhancements Steering Com-
mittee will select initiatives from this review for spon-
sorship and tracking.
Enhancements are also occurring at the other
NASA Centers. At JSC for example, operations en-
hancements evolve around ground infrastructure con-
solidation and technology upgrades. Space Shuttle and
ISSA activities and support is being consolidated to
include Integrated Mission Planning, Personnel Skill
Lockheed Martin Space Operations 1-6
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Figure 7. Shuttle Orbiter Evolution - Retrofit Modifications (Access to Space Study) 
Operations Improvements Offer Dramatic Cost Future Launch Systems Operability Applications,
Reductions, M. J. McCulley and J. F. Madewell, Space Technology and Applications International Fo-
AIAA, September 1993. rum 1996,
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Base, Mission Control, and Interactive Processing. The
new state of the art mission control center was devel-
oped using rapid prototyping activities and COTS
hardware/software where possible. It’s been estimated
that $100 Million in development costs were saved
and $20 Million per year in recurring operations cost
reductions will be realized over the previous outdated
MCC equipment and software.
Programmatic Enhancements
The Space Shuttle Program is in the process of
restructuring to achieve significant cost reductions,
Consolidation of contracts into a single Space Flight
Operations Contract (SFOC) will reduce management
overhead, eliminate duplication and increase overall
efficiency of operations. Additional changes will be to
eliminate discretionary vehicle hardware and software
changes, improve the payload integration process, re-
duce and consolidate STS Level II with ISSA, estab-
lish experience and redundancy based requirements.
The Master Verification Plan (MVP) and Hazards
Philosophy has been updated utilizing the program’s
experience base to reevaluate reliability, criticality and
reduce test requirements. Program reviews are cur-
rently being conducted for Launch Commit Criteria,
Flight Rules and Operations Maintenance Require-
ments Specifications (OMRS) which will dramatically
reduce ground testing and expand the Shuttle’s opera-
tional limitations. The goals of this overall effort are
to maintain acceptable safety risks, minimize work and
standardize flows. An example of the impact result-
ing from these changes is an estimated 50‰ reduction
in orbiter MPS system testing between flights.
Because program restructure reduces overhead
costs and MVP changes drive turnaround test philoso-
phy, these efforts will create the largest impact on STS
operations per flight costs.
Commercialization Possibilities
NASA has initiated a Reusable Launch Vehicle
(RLV) technology program which would lead to a pri-
vately funded and operated space transportation sys-
tem to eventually replace the Space Shuttle Program.
In the interim, a commercialized STS using the same
business strategies and technologies as envisioned for
RLV, including privately funded new build orbiters
should be evaluated for feasibility and as a possible
long term backup scenario. Today’s SSP policies
would have to be changed to allow an increased flight
rate and return to flying commercial and DOD
deployable payloads.
The Access To Space Option 1 Study concluded
that technology upgrades (Figure 7) to the existing
orbiters would reduce turnaround operations (based
on 1993 STS processing standards) by approximately
33% and for new build orbiters the reduction would
be upwards of 45%.
If the STS flight rate were increased from the cur-
rent 7 per year up to 14 flights per year the estimated
percentage overhead per flight would be reduced from
today’s 68% to about 39‰. These reductions when
leveraged against the reduced management infrastruc-
ture of SFOC, continuing SSP operations enhance-
ments and technology infusion could possibility re-
duce STS per flight costs to $3,000 per pound of deliv-
erable payload to LEO. This price is lower than all
commercial ELV’S other than China Long March and
Russian launchers (Figure 8), yet offers the added ca-
pabilities that only the STS manned orbiter can pro-
vide.
Summary
Even though the STS cannot approach the original
envisioned 160 hour turnaround goals, the fundamen-
tal design approach of the system allows for the capa-
bility of the most efficient, low cost launch system
available with advantages other launch systems can-
not compete with. Today’s Space Shuttle Program has
demonstrated launch success rate higher than any other
launch system with cost per pound to low earth orbit
(LEO) comparable to current heavy lift launch systems
and is improving through technology infusion, opera-
tions enhancements and management streamlining. A
commercial Space Shuttle Program may offer signifi-
cantly reduced space transportation costs over existing
launchers, yet afford capabilities no other existing or
proposed launch system can provide.
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